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ABSTRACT
The main purpose of investment treaties is to provide guarantees and protections for
the investors in order to maintain the flow of foreign direct investment. As a
consequence, when disputed, an adjudicator confronts a dilemma of figuring out the
actual intention that the parties consented to. As for umbrella clauses are concerned,
an interpreter falls into a loop to attain whether the parties consented to prioritize
investor’s interest and elevate any contractual breach to the level of a treaty breach, or
to consider the state’s regulatory power. The root could be traced to the interpretation
process itself. Human conduct differs from one another even in response to similar
incidents. This is attributed to the fact that it is affected by many factors, such as
previous experience, culture and traditions that may differ from one another.
Likewise, interpretation, a human conduct as such, cannot be predicted even to similar
texts. Moreover, even interpreters use the same tools and principles, they may reach
contradictory outcomes. This paper argues that the interpretation process will always
have its way to conclude different outcomes. However, instituting a centralized court
for foreign investment disputes with an appellate body assigned with review of legal
merits, composed of tenured, state-appointed judges, alongside with inserting public
law concepts in investment adjudication can mitigate the political symptoms of the
system and its inconsistent awards.

KEY WORDS: umbrella clauses, interpretation, investor-state arbitration, permanent
court, public law, proportionality, EU model.
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I.

Introduction.

A Chinese proverb reads, “there are three truths: my truth, your truth, and the truth.”
Personally, I cannot agree more with that quotation. Revealing the covert intentions of
a human being is, and will always be, like chasing a mirage, you think you see the
truth and are approaching it, but you do not reach it. The ultimate truth is always
debatable; each party to a humanitarian relationship whatsoever believes that the truth
is by their side. Detecting the mutual intention of the parties reflects an intervention
into a grey area that encompasses a lot of possibilities of equal probability.
The purpose of the interpretation process is to figure out the subject consent of
the parties in the light of the available objective indications. Hence, Interpretation, a
human conduct as such, could be affected by personal experiences, culture and
traditions. Hence, its outcome cannot be predicted and no outcome whatsoever can be
conclusively alleged to be the ultimate one. Despite the fact that arbitrators are guided
by the same objective indicators and apply the same general principles of law, they
may attain totally contradictory outcomes regarding what states have consented to.
Umbrella clauses represent a part of the bigger picture that interpretation
causes. An adjudicator while interpreting such a clause may fall into a loop for
detecting the prevailing and the actual mutual intention in the light of the
contradicting interest of both parties. It is undeniable that the first inclusion of
umbrella clauses was to guarantee protection for investors in order to maintain foreign
direct investment flow which is an integral incentive for states to conclude such
treaties. However, would that intent goes to the extent that a state may accept that
such a clause imposes restrictions on its regulatory power.
Part II of this paper traces the historical development of umbrella clauses
starting from its very inclusion and its main aspired purpose. Then, it reflects the
inconsistency in tribunals’ jurisprudence regarding interpreting umbrella clauses in
investment treaties. It illustrates the reasoning of each approach and their distinct
conclusions and the diverse methodologies even within the ones that adopted the same
approach. Part III illustrates that the inconsistency in arbitral awards regarding
umbrella clauses is a pragmatic façade of the interpretation conundrum. It dictates the
path drawn by the Vienna convention and concludes that it proposes such a broad and
vague criteria that still governed by subjective ideologies of interpreters asserting its

political nature. Part IV proposes solutions for attaining consistency in investment
arbitration. It explores the advantages and disadvantages of each proposal and
concludes that neither proposed attempt can provide an absolute solution for the
consistency or the impartiality of the system. However, a project that encompasses a
centralized permanent court composed of tenured state-appointed judges who follow
public law concepts in interpreting investment treaties can mitigate the inconsistency
of the system. The new EU permanent investment court provides a great gesture of an
impartial arbitration system that should be generalized.
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II.

Umbrella clauses.

A. The very emergence and purpose of umbrella clauses:
Foreign investments are often made through contracts between an investor and an
entity or institution at the host state1 in implementation of a bilateral investment treaty
(BIT) concluded between the home state of the investor and the host state. Some BITs
may contain a clause establishing a reciprocal obligation owed by the contracting
states that requires them respect and observe the obligations they have entered into
with investors of the other contracting state. These clauses may be inferred in many
titles such as umbrella clauses, mirror effect, elevator, parallel effect, and respect
clause.2 Figuring out its main purpose requires tracing the very emergence and
purpose of its first inclusion and the gradual evolvement the happened to its
interpretation.
The origin of the notion of umbrella clauses as such could be traced back to the
advice provided by Mr. Elihu Lauterpacht in 1953-1954 to the Anglo-Iranian Oil
Company in connection with the settlement of the Iranian oil nationalization dispute.3
The dilemma surrounding this case rose after the assassination of the Iranian Prime
Minister and the appointment of this successor who called for nationalization. In 1951
the Iranian Oil Nationalization Law came into force, according to which all oil
operations in Iran were to be carried out by the Iranian government.4 After further
negotiations for a settlement, Lauterpacht’s advice was to incorporate international
law as the proper applicable law in any settlement agreement. The purpose for such
advice was to dispose of the jurisdiction of domestic courts and to establish an interstate obligation to resort to international arbitration seeking for much more protection.
The main purpose of such an agreement was to consider any breach of the contract or
the settlement shall be ipso facto deemed to be a breach of the treaty between Iran and
1

Stanimir A. Alexandrov, Breaches of Contract and Breaches of Treaty: The Jurisdiction of Treatybased Arbitration Tribunals to Decide Breach of Contract Claims in SGS v. Pakistan and SGS v.
Philippines, 5 JWIT, 555, 555 (2004).
2
Yannaca-Small, K, Interpretation of The Umbrella Clause in Investment Agreements, OECD
Working Papers on International Investment, 3 (2006).
3
Anthony C. Sinclair, The Origins of the Umbrella Clause in the International Law of Investment
Protection, 20 Arbitration International 411, 412, (2004).
4
See A.W. Ford, The Anglo-Iranian Oil Dispute of 1951-1952 (University of California Press,
Berkeley,
1954); L.P. Elwell-Sutton, Persian Oil: A Study in Power Politics (Lawrence & Wishart, London,
1955); J.H. Bamberg, The History of the British Petroleum Company, vol. 2, The Anglo-Iranian Years,
1928-1954 (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1994), p. 488; M.A. Heiss, Empire and
Nationhood: The United States, Great Britain, and Iranian Oil, 1950-1954 (Columbia University
Press, New York, 1997.
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the United Kingdom.5 In other words, Lauterpacht intended to exclude any possible
dispute regarding the settlement agreement form the application of the Iranian Law
and hence being subject to a unilateral change by the Iranian government. For the
same purpose, this concept was again proposed in 1956-57 in Lauterpacht's advice to
a group of oil companies contemplating a trunk pipeline from Iraq in the Persian Gulf
through Syria and Turkey to the Eastern Mediterranean.
The “umbrella clause” as a distinct investment protection clause was first included
in the 1956-57Abs Draft International Convention for the Mutual Protection of
Private Property Rights in Foreign Countries (the Abs draft).6 It provided that:
“In so far as better treatment is promised to non-nationals than to nationals
either under intergovernmental or other agreements or by administrative
decrees of one of the High contracting Parties, including most-Favored
nation clauses, such promises shall prevail."
This clause reappeared in a much more explicit draft in the BIT between
Germany and Pakistan in 1959 (Article 7) providing that “(e)ach party shall observe
any other obligation it may have entered into with regard to investments by nationals
or companies of the other party.”7
In conclusion, the very and main purpose of incorporating such a clause was to
guarantee a higher level of protection for foreign investors and to maintain a resort out
of the national jurisdiction assuming that it will avail more protection. However,
recent case law showed inconsistency in arbitral awards due to different perspectives
concerning the actual intent of the parties to an umbrella clause.
B. Inconsistent arbitral awards.
It is undeniable that the first inclusion of what so called umbrella clauses was
aimed for the benefit of providing more protections and guarantees for foreign
investors. The main purpose of these clauses was to avoid possible application of
national laws and providing a resort to international arbitration seeking for more
protection against any unilateral acts of national governments. However, further cases
showed different ideologies of host states regarding their actual intuitions while
concluding BITs. Debates have been raised by state parties to BITs concerning their
actual consent to elevate contractual obligations to the level of treaty ones. The
5

E. Lauterpacht, Anglo-Iranian Oil Company Ltd Persian Settlement - Opinion' dated 20 January 1954,
4.
6
Yannaca-Small, K, supra note 2, 4.
7
Id, 4.

4

critical effect lies in that in case it is considered a treaty breach, the treaty arbitration
forum can consequently claim jurisdiction of which the national judiciary would be
deprived over any dispute between the investor and the host state. That was the
traditional understanding of the effect of these clauses within the literature and
tribunals’ jurisprudence until the SGS v. The Islamic Republic of Pakistan tribunal
rendered its dissenting award in 2003. A few months later, another tribunal –SGS v.
the Republic of Philippines- rendered a different interpretation of a similar umbrella
clause assuring the traditional expansionary approach, creating a massive literature
debate in this realm.
1. The narrower approach.
The SGS v. Pakistan award was the first to render such a restrictive interpretation for
an umbrella clause. SGS was a Swiss company entered into an agreement with the
Pakistani government for the provision of pre-shipment inspection services for goods
to be exported to Pakistan from certain countries (PSI agreement).8 It happened that
the Pakistani government unilaterally terminated the concerned contract. After going
through many litigation avenues, SGS filed a request for arbitration before the ICSID
for violating the Switzerland-Pakistan BIT. Amongst the pleadings of SGS and for the
purposes of this research, SGS claimed the breach of the umbrella clause included in
Article (11)9 of the concerned BIT requiring the Pakistani government to observe its
contractual obligations.
The tribunal started dealing with that question by assuring that it followed the
accepted norms of customary international law on treaty interpretation in terms of the
object and purpose of the treaty. It stated that “[a] treaty interpreter must of course
seek to give effect to the object and purpose projected by that Article and to the BIT
as a whole (emphasis added).”10
Then the tribunal set forth textual and practical arguments for its conclusion. It
stated that the commitments of which the observance shall be guaranteed by the
contracting parties are not limited to contractual commitments. Therefore, they are
susceptible to “indefinite expansion” to statutory, administrative or contractual
commitments. Moreover, these commitments may be of the state itself or any other
8

See https://iisd.org/itn/2018/10/18/sgs-v-pakistan/.
Art. (11) provides that, “Either Contracting Party shall constantly guarantee the observance of the
commitments it has entered into with respect to the investments of the investors of the other
Contracting Party.”
10
SGS v. Pakistan, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/13, Decision of the Tribunal on Objections to Jurisdiction,
6 August 2003, para 165.
9
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entity whose conduct could be attributed to the state. Hence, the tribunal concludes
that in the light of that broad indefinite text, it cannot be assumed that it was intended
to elevate every breach in relation to the contract to the level of breaches of
international treaty law:
The text itself of Article 11 does not purport to state that
breaches of contract alleged by an investor in relation to
a contract it has concluded with a State (widely
considered to be a matter of municipal rather than
international law) are automatically “elevated” to the
level of breaches of international treaty law.11
Moreover, the tribunal assured that accepting the claimant’s argument for that
sweeping impact of such clause requires clear evidence which the claimant fails to
provide:
[c]onsidering further that the legal consequences … are
so far-reaching in scope, and so automatic and
unqualified and sweeping in their operation, so
burdensome

in

their

potential

impact

upon

a

Contracting Party, we believe that clear and convincing
evidence must be adduced by the Claimant… that such
was indeed the shared intent of the Contracting Parties
to the Swiss-Pakistan Investment Protection Treaty in
incorporating Article 11 in the BIT. We do not find
such evidence in the text itself of Article 11. We have
not been pointed to any other evidence of the putative
common intent of the Contracting Parties by the
Claimant (emphasis added).12
As for the practical implications, the tribunal proposed four arguments for not
adopting such an expansive interpretation. First, that the far-reaching approach would
result in an unlimited flow of lawsuits as any alleged violation of the unlimited state
contracts and municipal legal regulations would be deemed as a breach of the BIT.
Second, it would make other treaty guarantees superfluous, since any simple breach of
contract would suffice to constitute a treaty violation. Third, the tribunal showed
11
12

Id, para 166.
Id, para 167.

6

concern about the inequitable consequences of such a broad interpretation. It claimed
that it would override any contractual forum-selection clause for the benefit of the
investor who would be free to resort to any dispute settlement mechanism either
according to the contract or the BIT. On the contrary, the contracting state would be
in a worse situation as it would be deprived of “any mutually agreed procedure of
dispute settlement, other than the BIT-specified arbitration” unless the investor
accepted it.13 Forth, the tribunal paid attention to the location of the article stipulating
the concerned clause. It concluded that the non-inclusion of that article within the
substantive “first-order” standard obligations undertaken by state parties to the BIT
reveals that they did not intent to incorporate it with any substantive obligation.14
Some tribunals have ended up to the same conclusion, but through different
methodologies. The Joy Mining v. Egypt tribunal admitted the distinction between a
contract-based claim and a treaty-based one and held that a purely contractual claim
would have difficulty in meeting jurisdictional-test requirement for a treaty-based
arbitral forum.15 It followed the Vivendi annulment committee decision when held that
“[a] treaty cause of action is not the same as a contractual cause of action; it requires a
clear showing of conduct which is in the circumstances contrary to the relevant treaty
standard.”16
Thereof, the tribunal held that umbrella clauses are not meant to unilaterally
transform every contractual breach to a treaty one unless that breach constitutes a
breach of other treaty-based guarantees on its own. Then, it concluded that it lacks
jurisdiction over the case because the fundamental basis of the claim is contractual
which cannot be treated as a treaty breach since the incorporated umbrella clause has
no such effect:
it could not be held that an umbrella clause inserted in
the Treaty, and not very prominently, could have the
effect of transforming all contract disputes into
investment disputes under the Treaty, unless of course
there would be a clear violation of the Treaty rights and
obligations or a violation of contract rights of such a
13

Id, para 168.
Id, para 170.
15
Joy Mining Mach. Ltd. v. Egypt, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/11, Award on Jurisdiction, para. 75
(2004).
16
Compañía de Aguas del Aconquija S.A. and Vivendi Universal v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case
No. ARB/97/3, Decision on application for annulment, para. 113 (2002).
14
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magnitude as to trigger the Treaty protection, which is
not the case. The connection between the Contract and
the Treaty is the missing link that prevents any such
effect.17
To the same end, the tribunal in El Paso v. Argentina exposed its methodology
that should end up in an interpretation that achieves justice between the protection of
investment without jeopardizing state’s sovereignty when stated that “a balanced
interpretation is needed, taking into account both State sovereignty and the State's
responsibility to create an adapted and evolutionary framework for the development
of economic activities, and the necessity to protect foreign investment and its
continuing flow.”18 It explained that such a far-reaching interpretation would render
the whole treaty useless since it would render any breach of any legal obligation of
the state, whatever its source or the degree of seriousness, as a breach of the treaty
itself. As a result, there will be no need for other high substantive protection standards
in the treaty.19
For achieving such balance, the tribunal proposed a very sensitive argument
by stating that a distinction has to be made between a state as a merchant and as a
sovereign.20 It confirmed that the conduct of the state as a sovereign is the sole type
from which investors have to be protected through resort to international arbitration,
and this is the case where umbrella clauses may have full effect21. It defined this kind
of contracts as those in which the state appears as a sovereign.22 It is worthy to notice
that this definition, to a large extent, resembles the definition of “contrats
administratifs” theory. Hence, breaches of ordinary commercial contracts entered into
by the state or a state owned entity would not amount to a breach of the treaty.
The tribunal asserted the backlash of such a broad interpretation of such
clauses as disrupting the threshold between national and international legal orders.23
Moreover, it ironically asked how private investors are supposed to use umbrella
clauses appropriately if ICSID tribunals used to grant them unexpected remedies. It is,

17

Joy Mining Mach. Ltd. v. Egypt, supra note 9, para. 81.
El Paso v. Argentina, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/IS, Decision on Jurisdiction, para. 70, (2006).
19
Id, para. 76.
20
Id, para 79.
21
Id, para. 86.
22
Id, para 80.
23
Id, para. 82.
18
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then, the responsibility of the tribunals to impose such appropriate restraints in order
to attain justice between both interests.24
2. The expansionary approach.
Shortly after the SGS v. Pakistan award, an ad hoc tribunal rendered a contrary award
in SGS v. Philippines, a case based on similar factual incidents, to the end that gives
effect to the umbrella clause. In 1991, the Philippines entered a contract (CISS
agreement) with SGS according to which the latter would provide pre-shipment
inspection services of the Philippines’ imports in the country of supply, including
verification of the imports’ quality, quantity, and price.25 Because of the Philippine’s
non-payment of invoices, SGS filed a request for arbitration before ICSID claiming
the tribunal’s jurisdiction and Philippine’s responsibility on the basis of, amongst
others, the umbrella clause included in Art X (2)26 of the Swiss- Philippines BIT.
The tribunal at first examined the textuality of the clause by asserting that it is
phrased in an obligatory mandate using the term “shall” like other substantive
standard obligation provisions of the BIT. The tribunal, then, deduced that the term
“any obligation” is broad so much so that it encompasses obligations arising under
national law including those arising from the contract.27 It held that this phrase was
much clearer than that of the Swiss-Pakistan BIT which reads “the commitments it
has entered into with respect to the investments.”28
Moreover, the tribunal held that any uncertainty in the language of an
investment treaty should be interpreted in a way that effects the object and purpose of
the BIT. Thereof, “It is legitimate to resolve uncertainties in its interpretation so as to
favor the protection of covered investments.”29 Additionally, if the parties intended to
limit its scope to obligations under international law, “such a limitation could readily
have been expressed.”30 Thereof, this encompasses all commitments made by the host
state towards investments and are considered binding even under municipal law.31

24

Id.
Matthew Wendlandt, SGS v. Philippines and the Role of ICSID Tribunals in Investor-State Contract
Disputes, 43 TEX. INT'l L. J. 523, 544 (2008).
26
It reads, “Each Contracting Party shall observe any obligation it has assumed with regard to specific
investments in its territory by investors of the other Contracting Party.”
27
SGS v Philippines, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/6, Decision of the Tribunal on Objections to
Jurisdiction, para. 115 (2004).
28
Id, para. 119.
29
Id, para. 116.
30
Id, para. 118.
31
Id, para. 117.
25
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The tribunal, then, refuted the reasons given by the SGS v. Pakistan tribunal. It
held, in response to the argument that a broad interpretation is susceptible of indefinite
expansion, that Art X (2) is not applicable to all legal obligations of general nature.
Yet, it applies to those that have been assumed by the host state vis-à-vis the specific
investment. Hence, it does not elevate to the international level all the municipal
legislative or administrative or other unilateral measures that could be binding under
the national legal system of the host state.32 It added that an umbrella clause is not
addressed to the scope or the content of these commitments, but to ascertain their
performance according to their applicable law. So, it does not change the proper law
from the municipal law of the contract to international law.33
Secondly, as for the principle relied on by the SGS v. Pakistan tribunal that “a
violation of a contract entered into by a State with an investor of another State, is not,
by itself, a violation of international law.” It stated that the concerned BIT at the
Vivendi case, form which that principle was cited, did not conclude a similar umbrella
clause. It stated that that effect is a matter of interpretation rather than to be
determined by any presumption, and an effective interpretation requires that effect. it
added that even in the absence of an umbrella clause in a BIT, a host state could be
internationally liable for a breach of a contract according to Art (3)34 of the ILC
articles on responsibility of the states for wrongful acts.35
The tribunal then agrees with the concern of the Pakistan case that the
contract’s forum-selection clause would be overridden. Yet it does not accept that this
be attributed to the broad interpretation of an umbrella clause since they both have
distinct arenas.36 But as for the fourth argument, which is related to the location of
umbrella clause after the “first-order” guarantees, the tribunal stated that the location
of the clause is not as decisive as its language.37
Many tribunals have adopted that broad interpretation. The Noble Ventures,
Inc. v. Romania tribunal asserted that an umbrella clause is certainly intended by the
parties to “equate contractual obligations governed by municipal law to international

32

Id, para 121.
Id, para 128.
34
It reads “The characterization of an act of a State as internationally wrongful is governed by
international law. Such characterization is not affected by the characterization of the same act as lawful
by internal law.”
35
SGS v Philippines, supranote 24, para 122.
36
Id, para 123.
37
Id, para 124.
33
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treaty obligations as established in the BIT.”38 Moreover, it held that the object and
purpose of a BIT and the principle of effectiveness of interpretation requires such an
expansionary one, otherwise, an investor would be deprived of “any internationally
secured legal remedies in respect of investment contracts that it has entered into with
the host state.”39
The LG&E Energy Corp, LG&E Capital Corp, LG&E International Inc. v.
Argentine Republic tribunal endorsed its understanding to the effect of the umbrella
clause to encompass any obligation towards foreign investors whatever their sources
are, including those derived from the investor-state contract, stating that these
obligations “receive extra protection by virtue of their consideration under the
bilateral treaty.”40 The tribunal concluded that the Gas Law and its regulation’s
provisions, governing the tariff scheme of the claimants’ investments, were not just
“legal obligations of a general nature,” instead they were specifically related to the
claimants’ investments since they were enacted and introduced by Argentine in the
Offering Memorandum for inducing such investments. Hence, the breach of such
obligations amounts to a treaty breach under the umbrella clause.41
Similarly, the Siemens A.G. v. The Argentine Republic tribunal asserted its
concurrence with that parties’ consent to the wide meaning of “any obligations it has
assumed with regard to investments” encompasses any failure to meet obligations
undertaken by the treaty parties, including those arising from underlying contracts.42
3. Inconsistent methodologies and outcomes:
Ironically, the hallmark awards of both approaches did not get free of criticism by
subsequent awards and have been followed by some tribunals but with driftage from
their final conclusions. Indeed, tribunals of both approaches criticize each other’s
conclusion for the same challenge that it transcends what state parties to BITs have
consented to and intended to achieve.43 Moreover, it cannot be assumed that there is a
consensus about the methodology of deduction of these approaches. Some tribunals
accepted a restrictive interpretation of the umbrella clause, but qualified the claimed
38

Noble Ventures, Inc. v. Romania, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/11, Award, para. 61, (2005).
Id, para. 52.
40
LG&E Energy Corp, LG&E Capital Corp, LG&E International Inc. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID
Case No. ARB/02/1, Decision on liability, para. 170, (2006).
41
Id, paras. 174-175.
42
Siemens A.G. v. The Argentine Republic, ICSID CASE No. ARB/02/8, Award, paras. 204-206
(2007).
43
Plama Consortium Limited v. Republic of Bulgaria, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/24, Decision on
Jurisdiction, para. 203, (2005).
39
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violated breaches to be a treaty one to give effect to the protection of the umbrella
clause. On the other hand, as for the expansionary approach, some tribunals have
included into the scope of an umbrella clause contractual obligations such as payment,
while others have favored obligations assumed through law or regulation.44 Others
have adopted an approach distinguishing between mere commercial contracts and
contracts in which a state appears as a sovereign. In another vein, the question of
admissibility of a claim in case there is an exclusive jurisdiction clause in the
investor-state contract raised another debate.
The CMS v. Argentina tribunal started its reasoning regarding the impact of
umbrella clauses by asserting that not all contractual breaches constitute a treaty
breach. However, an umbrella clause may operate to elevate a contract dispute to a
treaty claim if the act of the state amounts to a “significant interference” with the
rights of the investor:
The standard of protection of the treaty will be engaged
only when there is a specific breach of treaty rights and
obligations or a violation of contract rights protected
under the treaty. Purely commercial aspects of a
contract might be protected by the treaty in some
situations, but the protection is likely to be available
when there is significant interference by government or
public agencies with the rights of the investor.45
The tribunal allegedly stated that the claimed acts were “governmental
decisions that have resulted in the interferences and breaches noted.”46 Those claimed
interferences related to two stabilization clauses contained in the claimant’s license.
The first was the obligation not to freeze the tariff regime or subject it to price
controls. The second was the obligation not to alter the basic rules governing the
License without TGN’s written consent. Thereof, the tribunal considered that those
interferences were not just of a commercial nature; instead they attain breaches of the
treaty standard guarantees:
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[T]he obligation under the umbrella clause… has not
been observed by the Respondent to the extent that the
legal and contractual obligations pertinent to the
investment have been breached and have resulted in the
violation of the standards of protection under the
Treaty.47
In sum, although the tribunal followed the SGS v. Pakistan and Joy Mining v.
Egypt tribunals in accepting that an umbrella clause is not sufficient on its own to turn
contractual breaches to breaches of treaty-based guarantees, it, eventually, gave effect
to the umbrella clause but on a vague standard criterion. To illustrate, the license
granted to the claimant could be qualified as the contract concluded between the state
agency and the investor under municipal law. So, a breach of its clauses is eligible to
be regarded a contractual breach as well. Hence, the threshold of determining the
rights of the investor, recognized by the tribunal, is still ambiguous, whether they are
the general protections and guarantees adopted by the BIT or encompass those arising
from the contract too. Practically, the tribunal inter alias adopted an expansionary
interpretation without declaring that.
On the other hand, as for the expansionary approach, one leading case is the
SGS v. Philippines whose award has been criticized by other tribunals. Remarkably,
the El Paso v. Argentine tribunal criticized its outcomes for two shortcomings. The El
Paso tribunal held that such approach adopted by the Philippines tribunal would
render the whole treaty useless, since a breach of any legal obligation assumed by
municipal law, and not only a contractual one, would be “internationalized” and
trigger the state responsibility, then the whole protections of the treaty would be
superfluous. Moreover, the El Paso tribunal aroused the inconsistence of the
Philippines decision to stay the arbitral proceedings as for determining the amount
due. The El Paso tribunal stated that it sounded “strange” that the Philippines tribunal
held that “it has jurisdiction over the contract claims/treaty claims, but at the same
time that it does not really have such jurisdiction- until the contract claims are
decided.”48
The mythology and outcome of the Noble Ventures tribunal was criticized as
well. The tribunal started its deduction by assuring that as a general international law
47
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rule that in normal circumstances a breach of contract does not per se give rise to
international liability of the state. Thereof, since this rule is not a peremptory one, it
can be agreed to the contrary. Then it admitted that an umbrella clause is more like an
exception to a general rule, which consequently has to be interpreted in a strict
restrictive way:
[A]n umbrella clause, when included in a bilateral
investment treaty, introduces an exception to the general
separation of States obligations under municipal and
under international law. In consequence, as with any
other exception to established general rules of law, the
identification of a provision as an “umbrella clause” can
as a consequence proceed only from a strict, if not
indeed restrictive, interpretation of its terms.49
The El Paso tribunal faulted the Noble Ventures decision for the
unreasonableness of its conclusion to effect an expansionary interpretation of
umbrella clause after it asserted that it has to be restrictively interpreted.50
Another façade of inconsistency in arbitral interpretations of umbrella clauses,
especially those adopting the broad interpretation, is the issue of admissibility of the
claim before the international arbitral forum in case there is an exclusive jurisdiction
clause in the underlying investor-state contract.
This issue was firstly tackled by Lanco v. Argentina tribunal which held that
“when the parties give their consent to ICSID arbitration, they lose their right to seek
to settle the dispute in any other forum, domestic or international.”51 The SGS v.
Philippines tribunal took a different path by accepting its jurisdiction over a
contractual claim and accepted the admissibility of the case before it, however, it
decided to “stay the arbitral proceedings pending a decision on the amount due but
unpaid under the CISS Agreement” as there were pending proceedings before the
municipal tribunals. This approach was as well criticized by the Bureau Veritas,
Inspection, Valuation, Assessment and Control, Bivac BV v. Republic of Paraguay
tribunal that, although adopted an expansionary interpretation of umbrella clauses,
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adopted a more restrictive, conservative one regarding the relation to the contractual
forum-selection clause and its impact on the admissibility of the claim.
The Bureau v. Paraguay tribunal affirmed that an umbrella clause elevates
states’ contractual obligations towards investors to the level of international
obligations. Hence, the breach of such clauses triggers state international
responsibility and “give[s] [the] tribunal jurisdiction to interpret and apply the
contract as such.”52 In other words, such a clause would confer on the international
forum jurisdiction over all disputes relating to the state-investor contract including
payment issues, and the obligation to observe whether the contract-agreed disputesettlement forum was “available to resolve any “conflict, controversy or claim which
arises from or is produced in relation to” the Contract.”53
In the present case, the contract contained an “exclusive jurisdiction clause”
for the resolution of contractual disputes by reference to arbitration under the law of
Paraguay. The tribunal held that it was clearly intended to preclude any body other
than the Tribunals of the City of Asunción from resolving any dispute “which arises
from or is produced in relation to” the Contract clause.54
The tribunal reached with its expansionary understanding of umbrella clauses
to a higher level relating to determining its superiority vis-à-vis a forum-selection
clause in the state-investor contract. Indeed, the tribunal adopted a progressive
approach than that of the SGS v. Philippines tribunal. It asserted that the parties to the
contract are not free to pick and choose whatever they want from the contract
provisions to incorporate under the protection of the umbrella clause and ignore
others. Therefore, if the state organ is obliged to pay invoices in the scheduled time,
the investor is obliged to respect the forum selection clause contained in the contract,
so is the BIT forum.55 Indeed, the tribunal by so doing, it tackled the shortcoming of
the SGS v. Philippines when decided to “stay the arbitral proceedings pending a
decision on the amount due but unpaid under the CISS Agreement.” In its reasoning
for such an outcome, the tribunal ruled that it:
[C]annot accept that standard BIT jurisdiction clauses
automatically override the binding selection of a forum
52
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by the parties to determine their contractual claims. As
the ad hoc Committee said in the Vivendi case:
‘[W]here the essential basis of a claim
brought before an international tribunal is a
breach of contract, the tribunal will give
effect to any valid choice of forum clause in
the contract.’56
That decision dragged a massive criticism, even dissented by Antonio
Crivellaro one of the tribunal’s arbitrators, due to the confusion and dual standards it
adopted. The SGS v. Philippines asserted its jurisdiction over contractual claims under
the umbrella clause as an international law issue, and then it failed to follow to its
logic result by staying the arbitral procedures until the municipal judiciary decides on
the amount due as a contractual issue to be determined by it.
The tribunal shed the light on the inconsistency of the SGS v. Philippines
decision. After the SGS v. Philippines tribunal decided that an umbrella clause in a
BIT should have the effect of elevating every contractual breach to a treaty breach and
held that it has jurisdiction over the claim, It stated that a party should not be allowed
“to rely on a contract as the basis of its claim when the contract itself refers that claim
exclusively to another forum”, unless there were good reasons such as force majeure,
preventing the claimant from complying with its contract.57
The SGS tribunal then in order to overcome the obstacle of the effect of the
exclusive forum-selection clause after it has claimed its jurisdiction over the claim
based on the umbrella clause, and to go along with its ideology that “treaty
jurisdiction is not abrogated by contract,”58 it considered the issue of resorting to the
contractual forum is an issue of admissibility. It concluded that:
Normally a claim which is within jurisdiction but
inadmissible (e.g., on grounds of failure to exhaust local
remedies) will be dismissed, although this will usually
be without prejudice to the right of the claimant to start
new proceedings if the obstacle to admissibility has
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been removed (e.g., through exhaustion of local
remedies).59
Indeed, I believe that the Philippines tribunal felt reluctant to dismiss the case
after it decided to claim jurisdiction over the contractual claim. The Bureau tribunal
criticized this outcome on the basis that once a tribunal accepted jurisdiction over a
claim, it should resolve all its relevant issue. However, in case that there is an
exclusive jurisdiction clause in the state-investor contract, this would render the case
inadmissible for the non-fulfillment of the obligation to exhaustion of local remedies:
[i]f the parties to the contract have agreed on an
exclusive jurisdiction to resolve a dispute under the
contract, whether it relates to the amount that is to be
paid or the justifications raised by one party for non
payment, then it is exclusively for that forum to resolve
all aspects of the dispute under the exclusive
jurisdiction clause. If any agreement between the parties
on the amounts outstanding under the contract does not
resolve the contractual dispute, then exclusive
jurisdiction continues to vest in the agreed forum and
the ICSID tribunal is barred from exercising
jurisdiction.60
Amongst other reasons, The Bureau tribunal held that the umbrella clause in
the BIT dose not override the exclusive jurisdiction clause of the contract, and for the
preserve of the autonomy of the contract for the purpose that a claimant “cannot rely
on the Contract as the basis of a claim under (the umbrella clause) of the BIT when
the Contract itself refers that claim exclusively to another forum (emphasis added),” it
decided that the case was inadmissible.61
In conclusion, no concrete or ultimate interpretation could be attained for
either approach. Some tribunals that preferred such a restrictive interpretation, ended
up with giving effect to the umbrella clause through qualifying the breaches as treaty
ones (e.g. the CMS v. Argentine). Even those tribunals that accepted an expansive
understanding for an umbrella clause diverged as to its scope and its superiority to a
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contractual forum-selection clause. As for the scope; some tribunals limited the
expansive umbrella to the contractual breaches (e.g. SG v. Philippines), others
expanded it to all legal obligations assumed by the host state (e.g. LG&E Energy Corp
v. Argentine). As for its effect vis-à-vis an exclusive jurisdiction contractual forum
clause and its impact to the admissibility of the international arbitral case, such an
expansive approach of the effect of umbrella clause has been gradually deteriorated
vis-à-vis the contractual forum-selection clause for the benefit of the autonomy of the
investor-state contract.
In sum, seeking an ultimate and irrevocable interpretation is unattainable.
Either approach can be reached using the same tools of interpretation. Although every
tribunal is guided in its mission by the object and purpose of the BIT in order to attain
the real intentions of the parties, they end up with completely contradictory
interpretations. Even those who adopt the same ideology end up using different
methodologies and may end in diverse outcomes.
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III.

The bigger picture:

The issue of interpreting umbrella clauses shall be examined on a macro level rather
than limiting it to the microscopic view of whether it avail a greater protection for
investors.62 In other words, this dilemma represents a pragmatic façade of the
interpretation conundrum. Any interpreter’s main goal is to reveal the subjective
consent of the parties using the possible objective indications. Although the path is the
same, the outcomes are not guaranteed to be united. An interpreter may end up with
the conclusion that the state parties consented to bring contractual breaches to the
level of treaty breach. Yet, it might transcend their consent. On the other hand, an
interpreter may prioritize considerations of justice and reciprocity, by demonstrating
its closeness to what the states had in mind during the conclusion of the BIT, which,
in turn, may lead to a non-consensual interpretation. The split in tribunals’
jurisprudence triggered a lot of literature debate, which on its turn fell in this infinite
debatable circle for the purpose of revealing what is actually intended by umbrella
clauses.
The main starting point to be handled is that whatever the outcome of
interpretation and the ideologies of interpreters, whether they adopt a naturalist or
positivist ideology, they follow the same path drawn through Article 31of the Vienna
convention on the law of treaties. Hence, detecting possible solutions to the dilemma
of the inconsistency of investment arbitral awards should start by dictating whether
the path laid down in Article 31 of the VCLT could provide a concrete and solid basis
with clear results if being properly followed. This chapter argues that there is no such
a proper application of interpretation rules that could assure an anticipated outcome
due to the vagueness and broadness of such rules.
A. The Vienna Convention Path:
Article 31 (1) of the VCLT stipulates that “a treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in
accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in their
context and in the light of its object and purpose.” This paragraph lays down three
principles of interpretation; first is to interpret a treaty in good faith. The second
principle is that an interpretation has to reflect the ordinary meaning of the text. The
third principle is that this ordinary meaning has to be determined in the light of the
text, context and the object and purpose of a treaty.
62
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First, Good faith works as a general guideline to choose between two or more
competing meanings of the same treaty provision.63 As well, it provides a guideline
for the application of a treaty by both parties that it should be applied in a manner that
proves the good faith of each party to observe their obligations. Vividly, this criterion
does not propose a concrete basis or a module for it should be considered an
application in good faith or not.
Second, the ordinary meaning of the terms of a treaty should be considered in
an interpretation process. Interpreters shall consider the ordinary meaning of treaty
texts unless the parties explicitly intend to adopt a special meaning.64 Indeed, despite
the fact that the VCLT articulates revealing the ordinary meaning of treaty texts as a
means, it represents a goal rather than a means. In other words, the terms of a clause
could be drafted in a way that does not infer any special meaning, yet the parties
claim different ordinary meanings to be what they consented to.
Third, treaty terms shall not be interpreted separately. However, it shall be
interpreted in the light of the context of the treaty as a whole. A greater look should be
considered to all the treaty elements stipulated in article 31 of the VCLT. These
elements include the preamble, the annex, any agreement relating to the treaty which
was made between all the parties in connection with the conclusion of the treaty, and
any instrument, which was made by one or more parties in connection with the
conclusion of the treaty and accepted by the other parties as an instrument related to
the treaty. However, indications of these elements are subject to the discretion of an
interpreter and may not provide a concrete objective indication to the parties’ actual
consent.
Forth, the object and purpose of a treaty represent the most apparent and
desirable guideline in the process of interpretation. They do not represent an
independent means of interpretation, yet there is an inextricable relation between the
object and purpose of a treaty and the ordinary meaning of its terms. Indeed, the
ordinary meaning of treaty terms could be modified and altered from one to another
according to the object and purpose of each treaty.65 In fact, important as it may
appear, the parties to a treaty may embark upon concluding a treaty with different
63
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objectives and purposes. Investment treaties resemble a remarkable example in this
instance. An investor may claim that the main purpose of an investment treaty was to
induce investments and provide more guarantees for them however; a host state may
claim that the superior object of any international treaty shall not jeopardize a state
sovereignty. Therefore, the means laid down by the VCLT would constitute a
backlash to the conformity of the interpretation process as such.
Article (32) of the VCLT enumerates other means of as “supplementary
methods” of interpretation. It stipulates that “Recourse may be had to supplementary
means of interpretation, including the preparatory work of the treaty and the
circumstances of its conclusion,…” using the term “including” indicates that these
means are not exhaustive to certain ones, and it avails a wide discretionary power for
interpreters to resort to these means or any other ones that seem to be beneficial on a
case-by-case basis.
According to that article, the preparatory work (travaux preparatoires) of a
treaty could be used as a constructional start for applying the general rules and paths
of interpretation or as an indicator for dictating that the outcome was properly
deduced if it was ambiguous or absurd. The dilemma is that there is no neither a
definitive nor a conclusive definition for the preparatory work of a treaty.66 Therefore,
these works, whatever they are, could not be highly reliable because certain
documents or recollections on the intended meaning of umbrella clauses are neither
contemporaneous authoritative records of drafting history nor clearly independent of
interest in pending disputes.67 Similarly, the circumstances of the conclusion of a
treaty do not propose a reliable mean for a definitive interpretation. They may include
the contemporary circumstances and the historical context of the conclusion of the
treaty68 which by their turn are subject to the discretion of the interpreters.
In conclusion, the path provided by the Vienna Convention does propose
neither a definitive nor a reliable means for interpretation. Although the ultimate
purpose of an interpreter is to figure out the actual mutual intentions of the parties to a
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treaty using objective methods, the VCLT rules of interpretation are so much vague
and wide that still be affected by interpreter’s subjective perspectives.
Indeed, klabbders regards the process of interpretation as a highly political act
on the basis that interpretation’s main function is to reveal the meaning of words used
in treaties in order to delimit the rights and duties of each party.69 Consequently, he
claims that interpretation cannot be subjected to governing rules on the basis that
these rules could be ignored, distorted or manipulated in actual use, either by design
or actual ignorance. Many valid interpretations could be reached using the same
interpretation tools resulting in a political conflict, the same conflict intended to be
avoided through the inclusion of interpretation rules.70 He elaborates that readers
make much of their own stories to the extent that one can say interpretation depends
not so much on what the author puts into, but rather on what an interpreter takes out.71
Interpreters may jump to conclusions of their own making which may reflect their
ideologies, cultures, experiences, background assumptions and understanding of
things that may be totally different from that of the original author.
In a nut shell, although the attempt to govern interpretation by rules was aimed
to rationalize and depoliticize that conduct, I believe that interpretation rules laid
down by the VCLT does not put an end to its political character.
B. Interpretation discourse falling into the loop of subjective consent v.
objective justice:
Sources of international law doctrine used to be a playground for a tremendous debate
about the basis of law’s obligatory nature. These dichotomies originate from the basic
naturalism/positivism dichotomy which is premised on the binary of justice/consent.
Modern discourse tries to reach reconciliation by proposing moderate doctrines.72 The
progress of such discourse from the orthodox to the modern is what matters for the
purposes of this research.
The orthodox view of sources dichotomy considers the state consent as the
very source to be obliged by what it committed to. This view was widely challenged
on many bases. First, eliminating threshold between state’s will and law jeopardizes
69
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law’s ascertainment and results in an apologist system as it does not provide a
concrete basis for the obligation of non-consenting states. Second, it does not tell
where to deduce the consent of states especially on such a totalitarian level like the
international community. Third, this doctrine lapses in a logical dilemma that such a
consensual obligation presupposes the existence of a non-consensual rule that invests
consent with that law-creating effect.73
For such challenges and in order to avoid them, modern scholars have
proposed doctrines for law’s obligation distinct from consensualism like social and
economic necessities, e.g. the need of living in an organized society. However, as
koskenniemi puts it, this modern doctrine has not been more successful as its
predecessor on the basis of its ambiguity in terms of on what basis to derive
normative rules from such general concepts. He argues that this new discourse
showed the irony of things as naturalists (non-consensualists), by invoking social and
extralegal needs as a basis for the abidingness of the law, became positivists
(consensualists).74 To illustrate, inasmuch as these criteria are vague, its determination
is dependent on what states believe they are their interests. Hence, it is back to the
will and consent of the states.
Koskenniemi claims that it is “interminable circle” where consensualism is
needed to provide for law’s concreteness, i.e. law should reflect state’s interests.
Simultaneously, non-consensualism is needed since it provides a basis for law’s
normativity, which refers to law being binding even in cases opposing interests of
some states.75 The irony is that on the one hand, a positivist perspective supposes an
ascending justification based on the pure consent and elevating it to something more,
which is being obliged by something that overrules that consent, resulting in denying
its starting point. On the other hand, a naturalist perspective adopts a descending
justification giving the priority to justice by demonstrating its closeness to consent,
yet that in turn leads to a non-consensual outcome.76
The main argument of this paper is that interpretation is conducted in no much
better way than that irony. As kosknniemi puts it, most doctrines explain
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interpretation as a utility to give texts its normal or ordinary meaning. Article 31 of
the VCLT adopts the same ideology by referring to the “ordinary meaning to be given
to the terms.” He, however, claims that this doctrine starts with what is supposed to be
ended with.77
On the one hand, determining the ordinary or normal meaning of texts is the
very debatable point so much so that it cannot be regarded as a concrete given starting
point. On the other hand, either weighing subjective or objective understanding of a
text could discard the normal meaning of a text. First, if the intent of the parties was
so clear that it cannot be dismissed, then this mutual consent overrules any probable
meaning of the text. Second, if the objective considerations (e.g. justice and
reciprocity) were preferred, then the ordinary meaning of a text would be secondary.
Therefore, the normal meaning doctrine does not provide a conclusive and a concrete
theory for interpretation which returns to the very debate about the choice between
subjectivity and objectivity.
The irony about interpretation is that both subjectivity and objectivity
overlaps. Interpretation, in general, is a method to figure out the actual intent of the
parties; hence, this intent cannot be used as a starting point for attaining it. This intent
could be deduced from the text, subsequent conduct and good faith. In other words,
back to the irony, it could be concluded from other objective clues. Here lies the
dilemma, as an interpreter’s goal, even overwhelmed by an objective ideology, is to
deduce the parties’ subjective intent. So, at the end, to either would the credit be
attributed, the subjective or the objective approach? Moreover, in the end, by what
means could it be guaranteed that the conclusion of interpretation represents what the
parties have actually consented to? Eventually, the justification would be of the
interpreter not the parties,78 so it is subjective anyway.
The drafting of article 31 of the VCLT itself manifests this irony.
Koskenniemi claims that it adopts all possible thinkable ideologies of interpretation so
much so that it resembles a compromise between the subjective and objective ones.79
It starts with adopting objective indications for interpretation by stating that “A treaty
shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given
77
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to the terms of the treaty in their context and in the light of its object and purpose.”
This provision indicates that a text shall be interpreted in the light of objective
standards but as a means in order to attain the subjective intent of the parties. As a
consequence, this provision escalates the parties’ intent, so it provides in paragraph 4
that “A special meaning shall be given to a term if it is established that the parties so
intended (emphasis added).” The dilemma lies in determining how to be established
that the parties intended a special meaning other than the ordinary one. Would it be
the statement of the party (a subjective standard) or the tribunal’s justification? And if
it were estimated by the tribunal, on what basis would it justify its conclusion in
opposition to the intent of the party concerned? Would it be on an objective basis (like
justice, natural law principles and reciprocity) which will dissipate the parties’
consent which is the essence of interpretation? Or would it be on the basis that the
tribunal “knows better” which would raise doubts about its political character? In a
nutshell, it is like going through an infinite circle.
In conclusion, interpretation could start with an ideology and ends with the
contrary. Its main goal is to figure out the parties’ subjective intent using available
objective manifestations. However, an interpreter may reach a conclusion assuming
that it is what the parties consented to. Yet, it might transcend that consent, resulting
in denying its starting point. On the other hand, an interpreter may prioritize
considerations of justice, assuming its closeness to consent, which may
simultaneously lead to a non-consensual outcome. Although different outcomes may
be rendered, the irony is that the same path is followed using the same tools. Neither
outcome can stand alone as a concrete and lone basis for interpretation. Moreover,
neither can be alleged to be the ultimate legitimately justified one.
C. Umbrella clauses as a façade of the interpretation conundrum:
As previously mentioned, the primary purpose of the insertion of umbrella clauses
was to elevate a contract between an investor and a host state to the level of an interstate obligation between the host state and the national state of the investor.80
Afterwards, BITs used to include these clauses, but the question arises about what
states actually intended to accomplish by inserting such clauses. In other words, do all
states accept the insertion of an umbrella clause in a BIT for the purposes of attracting
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foreign investment with full acceptance of its possible impacts on state sovereignty, or
do they intend to maintain some sort of balance between state sovereignty and
protecting investors’ rights?
Many scholars argue for an expansionary interpretation of umbrella clauses.
Weil argues that the effect of an umbrella treaty is to turn the obligation to perform
the contract into an international obligation at the charge of the contracting State visà-vis the national State of the co-contracting party. Therefore, this gives rise to the
international liability of the state violating its contractual obligations and invests the
international forum established by the BIT with jurisdiction to adjudicate such
disputes.81
Mann claims that the object of an umbrella clause is to guarantee the success
of the investment by providing the investors with protection against any interference
with their contractual rights, whether this interference was a contractual breach or a
legislative or administrative act of the host state.82 Hence, it raises the international
liability of the host state if it happened not to observe its contractual obligations with
them.
Schill supports an unlimited and expansionary effect of umbrella clauses but
on a different basis. He sets aside the “contract claim- treaty claim” distinction
adopted by the narrower approach. Instead, he attributes its substance to the public
law norm pacta sunt servanda according to which a host state will be obliged to
preserve the investor’s interests against any interference whatsoever. Consequently,
apart from any traditional differentiation between a contract and a treaty obligation,
an investor will be eligible to resort to the international arbitral forum for any breach
by the host state.83
Scill proposes three arguments for the expansionary interpretation of an
umbrella clause. First, he claims that the plain interpretation of such clauses requires
the host state to observe its obligations vis-à-vis the investors independent of whether
its conduct is a commercial or a sovereign one. Second, he argues that this
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interpretation is the one to give effect to the clause. Otherwise, an umbrella clause
would be superfluous as it would replicate the obligations of the states to protect
investor-state contracts against any sovereign interference by the state, e.g. the
prohibition of expropriation without compensation. Third, this interpretation complies
with the object and purpose of investment treaties as such which is for the protection
of investors’ rights.
Scill refutes the narrower approach’s ideology regarding limiting state’s
international liability to sovereign acts. He elaborates the narrower approach
deduction which is based on the fact that an investor is not a subject of international
law, and the investor’s nationality state is not a party to the contract. So, in order for a
host state to be internationally liable for a commercial act violating the investor-state
contract, there should be a breach of international law. Thereof, the state’s conduct
shall constitute a tort under international law.
Schill, on the contrary, claims that this distinction is not convincing for many
reasons. First, delimiting a threshold between sovereign and commercial act is
unrecognizable. He claims that the actual incentive for an investor to embark upon an
investment is the promises and guarantees made by the host state against any
interference. A state conduct, on the other hand, can be recognized as a sovereign and
a commercial one at the same time resulting in gaps in the protection expected by the
investor. Second, he argues that both sovereign and commercial acts can be attributed
to the host state constituting an internationally wrongful act according to Article 4 of
the ILC articles on state responsibility.
Similarly, Wälde argues that the plain meaning of an umbrella clause and the
object and purpose of investment treaty mandates the protection of investors’ rights
against any interference by the host state. He argues that despite that the exact
meaning of such clauses is not decisive, they are logically meant to add something to rather than subtract from- the investors’ protection recognized by customary
international law. To illustrate, he attributes the authority of such clause to the
international-law principle pacta sunt servanda according to which the state parties to
the treaty consented to grant investors with extra protection. He describes the
inclusion of such clauses as a “progressive codification.”84
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Wälde attributes the contest about the effect of umbrella clauses to the old
debate between the NIEO and liberal advocates. The proponents of the so called
“New international Economic order,” abbreviated as “NIEO,” escalate the state
sovereignty so much so that it has the power to abrogate contracts depending on
domestic laws. On the other end of spectrum, liberal calls proliferated in response to
the need for international commerce under “good governance” for the realization of a
prosperous “global economy.”85 He claims that the narrower interpretation of such
clauses is just a replication of the radical NIEO advocates who argued for the
“absolute sovereignty” of the state according to which “a state does no wrong,” and
an investor-state contract is not a subject of international law. Hence, in their view, a
breach of such a contract does not trigger international liability. Wälde criticizes this
argument on the basis that the moment a contract is a part of an investment
arrangement; it implicates the involvement of governmental powers in this overall
process. Consequently, a breach of any part of such conduct is likely to be seen as a
breach of international law.86
Reluctantly, Shreuer argues that the expansive interpretation adopted in SGS v.
Philippines is preferable to the narrower one as “it does justice to a clause that is
evidently designed to add extra protection for the investor.”87 In spite of that, he
admits that a problem still arises if investors tend to use umbrella clauses for trivial
disputes. He argues that even if umbrella clauses’ object is to infer extra protection for
foreign investors, it is not their function to turn every minor disagreement on a detail
of contract performance (like payment delays or lease disputes) into a basis for an
international arbitration claim. Ironically, he argue that arbitral tribunals should be
qualified to develop their standards of interpreting BITs in order to achieve justice
between the legitimate expectations of the investors, and the concerns of the host
states.88
On the other hand, Sornarajah argues that expansionary arbitral awards have
extended the states’ commitments beyond their consent. Moreover, he claims that
foreign investment used to be a means of exploitation of the resources of host states.
He argues that what recent academics claim for the emergence of universally binding
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principles of investment protection is a myth. Rather, these efforts represent
conservation for absolute protection for foreign investors that has been articulated
during the neo-liberalism.89 However, acknowledging absolute and unregulated
guarantees for foreign investments have adverse effects on the environment, human
rights and labor standards.90
Moreover, he claims that the proliferation of BITs, as a consequence of neoliberalism, has witnessed a retreat due to the realization of developing states of the
massive defects of international investment arbitration. He explains that due to the
questions about the benefits for entering into investment treaties, many states have
withdrawn from the system, like some Latin American states that withdrew from
ICSID. Others drafted treaties that limited the scope of investment protection by
inserting provisions justifying state inferences with foreign investments.91 For
instance, Australia declared that its future treaties will not include investor-state
arbitration.92
In sum, it is worthy to notice that both approaches rely –whether explicitly or
impliedly- on the autonomy of contracts and the pacta sunt servanda principle to
argue for their conclusions. Proponents of expansive interpretation of investment
treaties -usually capital-exporting states- tend to reduce legal arguments based on the
NIEO positions, that is the exclusion of international law and accountability for acts
by (mainly Third World) governments. The pacta sunt servanda principle presents a
reliable counter-argument to assert that governments have an international duty not to
rely on governmental powers to violate contracts concluded with foreign investors.93
On the other hand, the narrower approach supporters argue that an expansive
interpretation of umbrella clause, so much so that it incorporates contractual breaches,
jeopardizes the autonomy of contract. Indeed, tribunals that adopted the expansive
interpretation were faced with the clash between such an expansionary approach and
the privity of contracts regarding exclusive jurisdiction clauses until it was fairly
handled with the Bureau v. Paraguay tribunal.
This irony reveals the similar paths both approaches pursue. Consequently, it
is not surprising that a positivist could infer from the wording of an umbrella clause
89
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that it is intended for imposing extra level of protection. Many indications could be
used to confirm that deduction. For instance, the object and purpose of an investment
treaty is to provide protections so much so that it could generate a convenient
environment for investment. Thereof, a positivist may employ these indications so as
to argue that the pacta sunt servanda principle mandates that states have consented to
such a clause and renounced some of their rights for another benefit which is
attracting much more capital flow.
On the other hand, a naturalist may consider this outcome as transcending the
consent of state parties themselves. However, a naturalist may argue that principles of
natural law and justice, e.g. good faith and reciprocity, require not exaggerating in
interpreting what is already an exception. Moreover, the pacta sunt servanda principle
requires maintaining the autonomy of the underlying investor-state contract.
In conclusion, figuring out the righteous mutual intent to which the parties
consented to is a matter a myth. This may lead interpreters to fall into a loop that may
never end to a consensual or plausible end to either party and this is the nature of
interpretation. Therefore, as long as this is an inevitable end, many scholars have
attempted to propose suggested solutions to meet these ironies seeking for much more
conformity and consistency for the credibility of the system as a whole and this is
what would be considered in the next chapter.
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IV.

Possible solutions:

A human conduct as such, interpretation, even governed by rules, is still be affected
by the ideologies of interpreters. As previously construed, the outcome of an umbrella
clause could be differed from a positivist to a naturalist, although interpreters follow
the same path and methods. In response, some authors suggested some solutions in
order to attain consistency among arbitral awards. This chapter argues that neither
solution can stand alone as a sole or perfect solution for consistency. However, the
very point has to be instituting a permanent body for investment disputes with a
system of appointing arbitrators by the states rather than involving the investors in the
appointment process. This proposal, alongside with balancing the drafting of
investment treaties and inserting public law conceptions like proportionality, could
result in a remarkable consistency and sufficiency of the system.
A. Eliminating disputed clauses:
The first and foremost solution that may be suggested for reforming investor-state
arbitration system would be eliminating disputed clauses. As for umbrella clauses are
concerned, some states tended to exclude umbrella clauses out of their treaties and
model BITs, in an attempt to make sure that only international law principles are
protected and not merely contractual obligations.94 For instance, the US, France,
Canada, and Colombia have adopted model BITs that do not contain an umbrella
clause.95 Moreover, multilateral treaties, such as NAFTA, the ASEAN–Australia–
New Zealand Free Trade Agreement, the EU–Canada CETA, and the EU–United
States Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) have excluded such
clauses.96
Indeed, the significance of insertion of such clauses cannot be totally
neglected. As previously discussed, the first inclusion of an umbrella clause was
aimed to guarantee a higher level of protection for foreign investors. Away from the
arbitral abuse of these validities by investors by resorting to international arbitration
for every contractual breach, the existence of such a clause is a must to confront any
arbitral intervention by the host states. Eventually, these clauses were proposed in
order to encourage the flow of foreign direct investment (FDI). Hence, these clauses
have, and actually are, still being existed “[to advance] towards the development of
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international investment law in general, the formulation of commonly accepted
functional standards acknowledged both by investors and host countries, which are
then consistently and uniformly applied, will be invaluable to reduce or eliminate the
present uncertainty in the outcomes.”97 For such reasons, some fund and investment
exporter countries, like German and Switzerland, are strictly proponent of umbrella
clauses and kept them in their models.98 Therefore, reforming the drafting of the
clause, along with the institution of a single adjudication body could develop much
more accepted standards whose application by an impartial centralized body could
reduce the inconsistency of the system.
B. Drafting reform:
The drafting of an umbrella clause that commonly contains the undertaking to observe
any commitments it enters with the investor of the other state plays an integral role in
creating the dilemma. As previously illustrated, figuring out the mutual intention to
which the state parties have consented to is a subjective matter that may differ from
an interpreter to another. That broad drafting raises questions regarding the limits of
the state regulatory power. A reform of the draft may be inserted to include that
investors protection shall not restrict the host state’s regulatory power.
The European Union and the United states have entered into negotiations
regarding a proposed trade agreement named “The Transatlantic Trade and
Investment Partnership (TTIP).” According to this system reforms are to be integrated
to the whole process starting from the very moment of concluding treaties. In
particular, this model asserts the protection of the rights of investors but with a
considerable recognition of states’ regulatory power. The TTIP proposal states that
investment protection “shall not affect the right of the Parties to regulate within their
territories through measures necessary to achieve legitimate policy objectives, such as
the protection of public health, safety, environment or public morals, social protection
or promotion and protection of cultural diversity.”99
Indeed, as balanced as it seems to be, the dilemma still exists. No matter how
precise the draft is, interpretation process does not provide nor guarantee specific
outcomes. As for the mentioned example, the clause recognizes the right of the Parties
to regulate within their territories through measures necessary to achieve legitimate
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policy objectives. In fact, determining the gravity of the circumstances causing the
undertaken measures would be subject to the discretion of the adjudicators. Likewise,
detecting the necessity and properity of these measures will be debatable among
disputing parties to which the draft, whatsoever, do not provide clear and cut limits. In
a nut shell, adjudicators will fall into the loop of the interpretation conundrum in spite
of how detailed the draft is.
C. Inserting public law concepts:
A significant aspect of investing foreign investors with great facilities and protections
in investment treaties is limiting the treaty purpose to investors’ protection without
addressing a comprehensive view of state regulation power. As a consequence, such a
pro-investor perspective has led to neglecting any potential protection and
consideration of the regulatory power of the host states. Such power, beyond
expropriation and nationalization, regarding such as provision of public goods and
services, and public order maintenance, should be considered in order to accomplish
some sort of balance between these interests and protecting investors’ rights.100 Public
law concepts can be permitted in interpretation in order to balance investors’ rights
and rights-limiting policy choices.101 This proposal is not a means per se, yet a
methodology of thought that could rebalance the disputed interests alongside with
balanced draft and through a permanent body of state appointed adjudicators.
Many standards could stem from public law jurisdiction. Proportionality
represents a significant method in order to attain balance between conflicting
interests. Proportionality stands as a method of interpretation that seeks balance
between rights and right-limiting policies. Its methodology is based on assessing
competing legal claims, weighing them, considering alternatives following some
limits, tests or standards to be met in order to attain such balance. It considers some
elements in the path of evaluating the gravity of means followed by a state and its
compatibility with the purposes aimed to be achieved. A proportionality analysis

100

See William Burke-White & Andreas Von Staden, The Need for Public Law Standards of Review in
Investor-State Arbitrations, in Stephan W. Schill, INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW AND
COMPARATIVE PUBLIC LAW, 689, (Oxford University Press, 2010).
101
See Stephan W. Schill et. al, Public Law Concepts to Balance Investors’ Rights with State
Regulatory Actions in The Public Interest- The Concept of Proportionality, in Stephan W. Schill,
INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW AND COMPARATIVE PUBLIC LAW, 75, (Oxford
University Press, 2010).

33

could be deduced through some tests, such as suitability, necessity and proportionality
stricto sensu.102
Indeed, a significant step in order to mitigate privatization of investor-state
arbitration system is to confer some consideration on state regulatory power. Public
law methods applied by state-appointed adjudicators could be successful in
delineating and balancing the conflicting interests of international legal order and
domestic public policy.
D. A permanent international court for foreign investment disputes:
A tendency for establishing a permanent international court for foreign investment
disputes has evolved among scholars for confronting the legitimacy crisis of the
investor-state arbitration system.103 The main purpose of such a project is for allowing
states alone to determine the composition of the bench. Investing the states with the
power to appoint tenured adjudicators raise the chances of their independence and
impartiality as they will not cater for more financial interests by possible future
nominations by their appointers. Fixing the adjudicators salaries will increase their
impartiality and fairness for the ultimate good of the system.
Instituting a centralized permanent court will play an integrated role in
reducing inconsistency in arbitral awards through centralizing control over
interpretation and application of investment treaty within a single appellate body.104
The significance of such a project can be highlighted by detecting the flaws of
existing arbitral systems, such as ICSID. Although ICSID entails parties to file an
annulment request before an ad hoc committee that is appointed entirely by ICSID,
the annulment cannot be based on legal merits. The annulment can only be filed for
five exclusive grounds which share in common a review of the procedural prosperity
of the award. When ICSID arbitration was first being tested, there was a tendency to
broaden the bases of review in order to reexamine the substantive merits of the case.
Subsequent ad hoc committees, however, confirmed the limited nature of review.105
Establishing a permanent court would include an appellate body which in turn
expands the bases of review on legal bases contributing in achieving consistency and
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harmony in the arbitral awards and honoring the credibility and predictability of the
system as a whole.
This tendency cannot be free from critics. Instituting an appellate body may
not guarantee a permanent and conventional jurisprudence regarding the interpretation
and application of investment treaties. However, the desirable purpose of such a
permanent body is not to eliminate inconsistency, because it is almost impossible due
to the nature of interpretation and the adjudication process itself. The main goal is to
reduce that inconsistency.
E. The EU model:
In order to confront and overhaul the flaws of the investor-state arbitration system
including the exceptional legal privileges that entail individual investors to sue states
directly for compensatory damages before an international tribunal and the
inconsistency of its awards, the EU proposed in 2015 the new investment court
system (ICS). This system was to be first applied to the EU free trade agreements with
Canada (CETA) and Vietnam (EU-Vietnam FTA).106 According to (ICS), decisions
regarding investment disputes are no longer made by arbitration tribunals constituted
of private arbitrators appointed by the disputing parties but rather by bilateral
investment courts staffed with public judges appointed for a fixed term by states.107
This system is anticipated to be the first seed for a permanent investment court to
reform the flaws of the investor-state arbitration system.108
The European model’s main pillar is to establish an appellate body of
permanent tenured, state appointed judges whose wages are fixed which insures the
impartiality of judges. Moreover, investing the judges’ appointment in states mitigates
the privatization of the investment arbitral system and infers public law
characterization which tends to attaining possible balance between investors’
protection and states’ regulation right. In addition, a second instance on legal merits
and not exclusive to formal review procedures like ICSID plays an integral role in
reducing inconsistency in arbitral awards.
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V.

Conclusion:

Detecting the actual consent of a treaty parties will always be like chasing a mirage.
Either outcome could be criticized to be beyond what state parties actually consented
to. Accusing the system to be biased is itself a superficial fallacy because a human
conduct can never be predicted and will always be an open-ended path. Umbrella
clauses stand as a façade of that conundrum where no one can negate its virtuous and
prosperous purpose. However, expanding its impact could result in an outcome
beyond actual consent.
This paper suggests some solutions for such a problem. However, neither
proposed attempt can provide an absolute solution for the consistency or the
impartiality of the system. Since the interpretation process and its outcome cannot be
governed and still affected by subjective ideologies, reforming the adjudicating body
through applying objective appointing standards could diminish the privatization of
the system and neutralize its function. Cleansing the system of political considerations
is a legitimate purpose for the neutrality and consistency of the system. The very
starting point on the reform path should be instituting a permanent court for foreign
investment. Moreover, reforming the appointing system of the arbitrators and invest it
in the hands of the state parties not to investors is a necessity for their impartiality.
The purpose is to mitigate the political symptoms of the system and its
inconsistent awards because attaining a perfect consistent system is not feasible even
with a single appellate body. A court of appeal may shift its tendency in some legal
issues over time. However, inserting balanced drafting reforms in investment treaties
to be interpreted by state appointed tenured judges using public law concepts like
proportionality to attain balance between conflicting interests will have a great effect
in reducing inconsistent awards and grow much more credibility for the system.
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